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 I. 
 
The Yasuni National Park in the East of Ecuador contains close to 900 million barrels-worth 
of crude oil, or roughly a fifth of Ecuadorean reserves. As a developing economy Ecuador is 
highly dependent on petroleum-related exports, and as such has an interest – and, as it 
happens, an interest protected under the international law of ‘permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources’ – in extracting that oil. At the same time, however, the Yasuni National 
Park is an important tropical rainforest: it is a haven for biodiversity; it contains several 
‘uncontacted’ indigenous tribes; and it functions as a significant carbon sink.  
  Consider the last fact in more detail. The world’s forests are tremendously important 
repositories for greenhouse gases; they contain roughly 650 billion tonnes of carbon, the 
equivalent of 2,300 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide. This is more than four times the amount 
of CO2 emitted by humanity since the beginning of the industrial revolution. Among the 
world’s forests, rainforests are especially effective at sequestering CO2, whereas their 
destruction not only erodes that sequestering capacity but releases huge quantities of CO2 
back into the atmosphere, thereby potentially accelerating dangerous climate change. Indeed 
while we await the fruition of grandiose projects of geo-engineering, the protection, 
enhancement or extension of rainforests is often thought to be the one serious option 
available for slowing rises in greenhouse gas levels in the world’s atmosphere.1  
                                                 
1 For written comments or instructive questions, thanks to Oliviero Angeli, Megan Blomfield, Simon Caney, 
Matthew Clayton, Clare Heyward, Andrew Mason, David Miller, Ed Page, Massimo Renzo, Cedric Ryngaert, 
Fabian Schuppert, Zofia Stemplowska, Adam Swift, Steve Vanderheiden and Kit Wellman.   
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 All of which produces a dilemma for the people of Ecuador. They can either protect 
the rainforest in Yasuni – thereby foregoing opportunities for economic development – or 
extract the oil, but reduce our collective capacity to avoid dangerous climate change. But we 
might ask, of course, why it is the people of Ecuador who should face this dilemma, rather 
than all of us. Protecting rainforests has costs: these include direct costs, as when resources 
are spent keeping out illegal loggers, or when forests are tended and replanted. They also 
include opportunity costs, as when an agent, in protecting forests, foregoes the benefits from 
economic development which might otherwise have been secured. Who those costs ought to 
be borne by is an important question for a theory of global justice. Notably, the rainforests of 
our world are concentrated in several clusters, with the lion’s share falling within the 
territories of developing states in South America and Africa. Should the inhabitants of those 
states bear the costs of protection alone? 
 The view of Ecuador’s government is that the answer to the last question must be a 
resounding negative. In 2010 it established the Yasuni Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini 
Initiative, comprising a fund administered by the United Nations Development Program.2 
Foreign governments, charities and individuals were invited to contribute towards a 
fundraising target of US$3.6 billion by the year 2023. If that target was met, Ecuador 
declared that the oil field would not be developed. If not, it would be. The choice for the rest 
of the world was simple: if you believe that we ought to protect the Yasuni forest, share with 
us the costs of doing so. 
 The Initiative was controversial, and in August 2013 it was declared a failure and 
disbanded, having achieved actual deposits (as opposed to promises) of a mere $13 million.3 
One set of concerns revolved around issues of partial compliance: for instance if (as many 
people feared) the Initiative failed to reach its target, what would happen to any deposits 
made? But there were also deeper normative questions: Did the Initiative represent, as was 
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suggested at the time of its inception, an objectionable form of ecological hostage-taking 
(‘give us the money or the forest dies’)? Should we consider any donations made 
supererogatory (‘good but optional’) moral acts, or are outsiders bound by justice to share in 
the costs of rainforest protection?  
 Two broad arguments could be appealed to in order to support the conclusion that 
outsiders do have duties of justice to share in those costs. One would be an egalitarian 
argument which suggested that, if it is unjust for some communities to face inferior 
opportunities merely because of the relatively meagre shares of natural resources existing 
within their territories,4 then it must also be unjust for some countries to bear greater burdens 
simply because the resources contained within their territories happen to be ones which 
justice requires the protection (and non-exploitation) of. If justice requires the pooling of 
benefits, then it likely also requires the pooling of at least some burdens.  
 Whilst many will be sympathetic to that argument – including the present author – it 
is not the argument Ecuador is presenting in defence of its claim to protection payments. The 
argument from Ecuador is of a different character, suggesting that outsiders should pay not to 
offset some cosmic arbitrariness, but rather because they are in receipt of important benefits 
the costs of securing which are currently being borne by Ecuador.5 The argument appears to 
turn on a version of the principle of fairness, and this is the argument I will explore in this 
paper.6  
 Of course it could be that Ecuadoreans have merely overlooked the egalitarian 
argument, and that it would add greater force and cogency to their demands if they engaged 
with it. That diagnosis seems unlikely. Rather than overlooking the egalitarian argument, 
Ecuador appears to be deeply committed to a principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources which is usually taken to stand at odds with it. The crux of its complaint is that if 
‘its’ forests are to be protected, it will have to forego development opportunities which would 
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otherwise be its right. Rather than bemoaning that fact this paper capitalises on it, because it 
opens up a very important possibility. If the argument from the principle of fairness can be 
made successfully, it may convince political philosophers who endorse self-determination 
over resources, the conventional prerogatives of nation-states, and who reject global 
egalitarianism as a controversial or overly demanding or ambitious doctrine, and ordinary 
citizens and politicians who are often just as wedded to the principle of permanent 
sovereignty. Given that rainforest protection is an urgent requirement if dangerous climate 
change is to be averted, and given that programmes aiming to divert funding to rainforest 
protection are chronically underfunded,7 agreement from those quarters would be invaluable.   
 
 
 II.  
 
Some necessary preliminaries. This paper draws upon the ‘principle of fairness’ to support 
the conclusion that outsiders are bound by justice to share these costs, and that if they refuse 
to do so they can be found guilty of free-riding. The principle of fairness is familiar from 
discussions of public good provision within states, but the argument necessitates its extension 
across two dimensions. First, it must be shown that the argument can intelligibly be applied 
across borders. Second, whilst typically applied to cases of public good production, the paper 
applies the argument to public good protection. What is morally significant about public good 
production – and what potentially gets the debate about free-riding going - is that agents sink 
costs into securing benefits which then accrue to other agents (who are potentially able to 
avoid sharing those costs). But protection displays the same features: when a rainforest – or 
any other resource which provides important ‘ecosystem services’ – is protected against some 
threat which would diminish or destroy its capacity to provide those services, agents are once 
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more sinking costs into securing greater benefits than would counterfactually exist, outsiders 
cannot be excluded from those benefits, and the same possibility of sharing or refusing to 
share in those costs emerges.  Beyond these two extensions, we must also face a series of 
formidable challenges to the principle which have attempted to circumscribe the class of 
cases to which it can intelligibly apply, with attempted scope-restrictions chiefly focusing on 
the intentions of both consumers and producers of public goods. The present paper shows that 
the rainforest case can survive these challenges, and in demonstrating that it also advances 
our understanding of the principle and its scope. It provides, the paper suggests, the most 
compelling formulation of the arguments of forest states. But if successful the argument will 
also have implications beyond those cases.  
 A few comments about public goods are also in order. In the case of many natural 
resources - such as oil, diamonds and gold - the benefits arising from those goods are 
typically highly excludable, a fact which marks them out as examples of private goods. 
Rainforests, however, are Janus-faced. They can function as private goods, as when trees are 
felled and used to build houses and furniture. But if left intact they deliver benefits from 
which outsiders cannot be excluded. This marks them out as examples of public goods,8 and 
explains the relevance of the principle of fairness to the question of how to share the costs of 
their provision or protection. Note, however, that there is some diversity within the category 
of public goods. In the case of a ‘pure’ public good consumption is not only non-excludable 
but non-subtractive, so that consumption by one agent does not leave less for subsequent 
consumers. ‘Collective’ goods, on the other hand, share with pure public goods the feature of 
non-excludability, but not the condition of non-subtractiveness.9 In the case of collective 
goods when an additional person begins to consume this immediately leaves less for others. 
Some of the benefits arising from rainforests are best viewed as pure public goods (as when 
trees produce the benefits of flood-protection or the sustaining of biodiversity), but others are 
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best viewed as collective goods (as when trees absorb carbon dioxide: we consume quite 
unequal quantities of the sequestering capacity of the carbon sinks of the world, and each 
time a person is born the demands on that shared resource are intensified). Though it has been 
neglected within discussions of the principle of fairness, it is shown below that the difference 
between pure public goods and collective goods has significant normative import, and that 
the argument from the principle of fairness goes through much more easily in the latter case. 
 Section III of this paper introduces the principle of fairness, and sketches a stylised 
case in which one country protects the carbon-sequestering capacities of rainforests, thereby 
securing a collective good which is also enjoyed by others. Section IV then considers some 
forceful arguments to the effect that we should constrain the scope of the principle to cases in 
which consumption meets certain conditions. It shows how the rainforest case survives those 
objections. Section V considers a further set of attempts to constrain the scope of the 
principle to goods which are produced in certain ways. It shows that the rainforest case can 
survive those attempts, and, moreover, it defeats the claim that beneficent intentions are a 
necessary condition for the principle to apply. Section VI argues that, once the argument for 
sharing the costs of protection has been admitted, it plausibly adumbrates both direct and 
opportunity costs, including, therefore, the value of foregone opportunities for economic 
development.  
Section VII concludes that pooling the costs of protection is required by justice, and 
that the principle of fairness provides a compelling account of why that is the case. If the 
argument is successful then it appears plausible that it could apply to the protection of other 
natural resources which deliver important ecosystem services, where costs are localised but 
benefits are enjoyed more widely. The paper, though, concentrates on the - hugely significant 
- case of rainforests. More broadly, it takes no official position on the question whether the 
costs of rainforest protection should be pooled in isolation from other benefits and burdens 
 7 
relevant to natural resource justice, climate justice more broadly, or global justice still more 
broadly, or whether they should be integrated with them. It may be plausible, for instance, 
that they should be integrated as one datum amongst many others relevant to calculating just 
distributive shares.10 Alternatively, it might be plausible given the urgency of rainforest 
protection to secure agreement on rainforest protection first, at least at the level of policy. 
The paper merely aims to demonstrate what is a significant enough conclusion, to the effect 
that powerful reasons exist for sharing the costs of rainforest protection globally, and that if 
outsiders refuse to do so we are guilty of free-riding; and in so doing it shows that even those 
sceptical about the egalitarian argument from the inherent arbitrariness of natural resource 
distribution can, in this vital case at least, be brought to converge on the same conclusion. 
 
  
III.  
 
In discussions of the provision of public goods, the dangers of ‘free-riding’ have received 
considerable attention. A free-rider is depicted, typically, as someone who consumes11 non-
excludable goods but avoids paying anything towards their provision. When I avoid sharing 
in the costs of provision I exploit the difficulties of enforcing payment and thereby oblige 
others, inappropriately, to subsidise my own ends.12 The principle of fairness provides an 
account of just when those who benefit from the provision of public goods ought to share in 
the costs of their provision and just when, correspondingly, refusing to assume a fair share of 
those burdens is morally objectionable.13  
The kind of discrimination which the principle seeks to underpin is important, 
because it cannot be the case that costs should be pooled whenever someone produces non-
excludable goods. By common consent the charge of free-riding cannot apply to cases where 
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the provision of public goods is woefully suboptimal, in which it fails to serve genuinely 
shared interests, or in which costs are not fairly shared. Discussion has centred on cases 
where the collective provision of a non-excludable good is the optimal solution – where 
collective provision, that is, is obviously superior to a scheme in which individuals seek to 
advance their own ends individually and hence is worth its cost - and where the share of costs 
which beneficiaries are asked to pay is a fair one.14 
The last point bears closer scrutiny, because the principle does not by itself appear to 
settle the question of what constitutes a fair share. It might produce a presumption, we could 
say, towards tailoring the share of costs to the scale of benefits each agent enjoys. But 
potentially, a variety of views on what constitute distributively-fair shares might intervene 
when it came to determining the share of costs any one agent should ultimately bear. To keep 
that possibility open the paper assumes throughout that the conclusions delivered by the 
principle are pro tanto ones. For cases meeting certain conditions, the principle identifies a 
pool of agents who are morally liable to bear costs. But perhaps, in any particular one of 
these cases, we know that agent N has a much higher disposable income than agent O. Where 
this is so, some accounts of fair shares will find it intelligible to require N to contribute more 
than O. Perhaps, in an extreme case, requiring agent P to bear any costs at all would tip her 
into severe poverty, and hence it may make moral sense to exempt her. If so a pro tanto duty 
to share in costs is being modified – or, in extreme cases, defeated – by the appearance of 
something like an ability-to-pay principle. The kinds of exemptions that this generates are 
commonplace within welfare states and as such are, properly understood, part and parcel of 
the business of the principle of fairness in practice. The principle identifies a pool of potential 
contributors, but may not fully determine the allocation of costs between those agents. 
The principle of fairness, suitably constrained and qualified, can give force to our 
intuitions about when and how the costs of securing public goods should be shared. It has 
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often been thought, more expansively, that such an account provides the beginnings of an 
answer to the question why citizens ought to obey the state.15 That issue will be bracketed 
here: rather than focusing on such ‘political’ obligations, this paper focuses on duties to bear 
a share of the costs of rainforest protection. Likewise, it focuses not on duties to cooperate to 
secure public goods, but on duties to share the costs of public goods which are secured. 
Significantly, it is plausible to hold that moral duties to share costs can cross borders, 
regardless of whether we believe that political obligations intelligibly can.16 Consider the 
following example:  
 
Poisoned Lake. A lake spanning two countries sustains fishing industries upon which 
both depend. Tomorrow the government of country A discovers an underwater 
geyser, just on its side of the national boundary, which has started to belch out 
methane. Uncontrolled, the methane will soon destroy all of the fish which the lake 
currently provides (equally) to both countries. Placing a concrete cap on the geyser 
will be expensive, and the government of A asks the government of B to share in the 
costs.  
 
Here country A, in capping the geyser, is responsible for the continued existence of a good 
upon which both countries depend. Whilst country B can refuse to share the costs of 
protection – and, indeed, it might be ‘rational’ for them to do so, in the knowledge that if so 
country A will go ahead and bear the costs itself, given the lack of any coercive institution 
capable of enforcing cost-pooling – it is hardly just for them to do so. To make the injustice 
still more apparent, we can stipulate that the reason it is necessary for country A to cap the 
geyser is that the fishing activities of both countries have disturbed it, and that the amount of 
concrete required to cap the geyser – hence the cost of the cap – is directly related to the 
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incidence of fishing. In that case, for country B to refuse to contribute is still less defensible: 
the cost borne by A is imposed by an activity which both countries benefit from, and the 
scale of the cost increases in a linear fashion with the degree of benefits which country B 
(along with country A) extracts. Notably, many cases considered by scholars of the principle 
of fairness involve consumption of pure public goods, where the arrival of one more 
consumer does not load more costs onto providers. But the Poisoned Lake situation is 
different – and can be considered a case of free-riding par excellence - insofar as the costs 
imposed on the agent protecting a public good rise in direct proportion to the benefits enjoyed 
by others (who refuse to share those costs). As I argue in section V, it is far from obvious 
why the fact that the benefits in question accrue across national borders rules out such a 
conclusion.  
But if examples of this variety have any persuasive power, they should convince us to 
devote serious attention to the costs associated with the protection of important ecosystem 
resources such as carbon sequestration. Unfortunately they have received limited attention 
from theorists of distributive justice to date, perhaps because of a mistaken belief that 
significant public goods are seldom supplied transnationally.17 For instance, Andrea 
Sangiovanni’s restriction of principles of equality to the domestic level is premised precisely 
upon the idea that important public goods are only provided to each other by co-citizens, 
triggering egalitarian principles sharing benefits and burdens between them, but not across 
borders.18 But this is false: even if we adhere to Sangiovanni’s inordinately brief list of two 
key public goods (physical security and a property system) it is evident that they are 
frequently supported at least in part by agencies outside of individual states; if we are willing 
to think beyond physical security and a property system, we quickly arrive at other public 
goods which are similarly vital but whose delivery is not neatly demarcated according to state 
boundaries. Environmental public goods are a case in point.  The benefits provided by 
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important ecosystem resources – such as carbon sequestration – may be vital, but are no 
respecters of national boundaries. Moreover they appear to easily meet the conditions for 
discussion under a principle of fairness outlined above. The goods provided are non-
excludable, in the sense that no-one can be prevented from enjoying them. And their 
provision is also typically very cost-effective when compared to the alternatives: although 
rival methods of carbon sequestration have been mooted, for instance, they have not 
established themselves as anything like as cost-effective as the normal sequestration 
capacities of rainforests. The moot point, in the case of rainforests, is not whether the benefits 
provided are non-excludable or whether they are worth their cost. The point of contention is 
whether the costs should be borne by locals, or else shared more widely.  
To keep the inquiry manageable, in what follows we will concentrate upon one 
relatively straightforward type of case, in which a rainforest is contained within a particular 
community, but provides non-excludable benefits to all of humankind. We will also 
concentrate on one benefit only: the collective good of carbon-sequestration. Nothing much 
turns on that restriction other than the manageability of the discussion. We need not assume 
that forests should only be protected because of their sequestration function. They might be 
thought to be intrinsically valuable, or to support valuable biodiversity, or to harbour 
indigenous tribes whose ways of life have distinctive value; if so then the project of 
protection becomes still more important, and good policy would have to find some way of 
advancing all three goals. But still, paying due attention to the good of carbon-sequestration 
is enough to motivate the case for protection, and the moral case for sharing its costs. I return 
to the question of advancing the other goals in section VII. The fact that our emissions are 
sequestered somewhere, and that existing stocks of carbon are not unlocked, is essential in 
order to avoid dangerous climate change. Our question will be about where any costs 
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involved in securing the good of sequestration and storing should fall. Call to mind, then, a 
community called Arborea: 
 
Arborea wishes to advance economically, but the most assured way of doing so will 
involve cutting down substantial parts of its native forests. The rainforests within its 
territory, though, produce carbon sequestration functions upon which all depend. In 
the face of the predictable protests it maintains that it is unfair that it alone should 
bear the costs of protecting the forest, and argues that if it is to refrain from 
deforestation then those costs should be shared among all beneficiaries – that is, 
between all of us. 
 
Key features of this case are as follows: the benefits in question are non-excludable: 
Arboreans cannot decide whose emissions the trees will sequester, or prevent outsiders from 
using up their absorptive capacity. Secondly, I stipulate that they are necessary: if disastrous 
climate change is to be averted, it is essential that emissions are sequestered;19 but although 
carbon capture projects have been mooted, no large-scale alternatives to (Arborean) rainforest 
sequestration exist. If that changes, then the moral situation changes too (see below). But in 
the immediate future it appears highly unlikely to. This means, amongst other things, that it is 
intelligible to say that Arboreans are under a duty of justice to protect their rainforest, a 
position which is compatible with the view that outsiders are under a duty to share in the 
costs of their performance of that duty (see section VI). Finally, they are subtractive: 
sequestering capacity is finite, and hence by definition each unit of sequestering capacity 
used up by anyone leaves less for others. Notice, in particular, that the amount of its forest 
that Arborea must preserve to avoid dangerous climate change is not a function of its own 
level of emissions but of the total level of emissions worldwide. Outsiders determine, along 
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with Arboreans, how much rainforest needs to be protected and hence how costly that 
protection will be. In those circumstances, then if outsiders refuse to share in the costs of 
protection a charge of free-riding is appropriate.  
But before endorsing that conclusion we need to face a series of bracing criticisms of 
the principle of fairness, which suggest that the range of cases to which it can be applied it 
narrower than we might suppose. Those challenges must be either rejected, tamed or avoided 
for the conclusion in the Arborean case to be secure. 
 
 
IV. 
 
Our first objection holds that it is only appropriate to invoke the principle of fairness in cases 
where shared benefits are consumed in certain specified ways. The core thought is that it 
creates a perverse moral hazard if we are authorised to impose cost-sharing duties upon 
people by thrusting upon them services they have no desire for – by, in Nozick’s famous 
example, throwing books in their windows and then demanding recompense. On Nozick’s 
view this is impermissible: ‘One cannot, whatever one’s purposes, just act so as to give 
people benefits and then demand (or seize) payment.’20 John Simmons has usefully focused 
this general line of attack by suggesting two necessary conditions for the principle of fairness 
to apply: benefits must be knowingly and willingly accepted.21 
One well-known response to Simmons’s objection invokes a set of ‘presumptively 
beneficial goods’ which are essential for any minimally tolerable human life. The thought 
here is that even if the principle of fairness ought not to apply to ‘dispensable’ or luxurious 
public goods, requiring people to pay a share of the costs of producing (or protecting) goods 
which they uncontroversially need is less problematic.22 A similar move is in order in the 
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Arborean case: without the carbon-sequestering functions of rainforests – if all of the world’s 
rainforests burned tomorrow, for instance, ceasing to sequester carbon and unlocking it in 
vast quantities – everyone’s most basic projects would very quickly become seriously 
disrupted and many lives would be endangered. But if carbon emissions must be sequestered 
somewhere, and if people have not made private arrangements to offset their emissions, they 
appear liable to share in the costs of the one scheme – the Arborean one – which can secure 
this good.  
But does this move meet Simmons’s challenge? Take the knowledge condition first. 
For a benefit to be knowingly accepted it must, for Simmons, be the case that we know that it 
is produced by someone and that there are costs attached to producing (or here protecting) 
those benefits. This, on Simmons’s view, holds even if the good in question is genuinely 
necessary to each agent.23 We could observe, here, that the knowledge condition does not 
appear likely to present major problems for Arborea-type cases. The role of the rainforests as 
‘the lungs of the world’ is well-known even to schoolchildren, after all. In all but marginal 
cases we know roughly where rainforests are located and that there are costs attached to 
protecting them. Citizens in the developed world – and their leaders – regularly bemoan the 
deforestation of the Amazon, for instance, because its carbon-sequestration function is well-
understood. And whilst there has been little readiness in practice to share in the costs of 
protection, it is not usually denied that costs exist. The point at issue is who should bear them. 
We might suppose, then, that the moral situation changes once we make clear to outsiders 
that they are dependent on public goods, and that their production or protection is not cost-
free. But for Simmons, importantly, pointing this out is insufficient, because it is the belief 
that results (or fails to result) which matters morally. We might then be forced to try to 
establish that those who refuse to believe in that dependence or in those costs (which facts we 
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have stipulated are factually true) are culpable in their failure to develop the appropriate 
beliefs.  
My response is a more fundamental one. I deny that acceptance of the costliness of 
production or protection is necessary to generate duties to share in those costs (and as a 
logical consequence, I submit that innocent free-riding is an intelligible category and not an 
oxymoron). The apparent plausibility of the knowledge condition, it seems to me, rests upon 
ambiguity about the role that the principle of fairness is supposed to play in moral argument. 
Distinguish two questions: on the one hand, we have the question of whether agents have a 
duty to share in the costs of producing or protecting (here: necessary collective) goods. On 
the other hand, we have the (subsidiary) question of whether, when agents fail to act on a 
duty to share in those costs, their (in)action is morally blameworthy (in the sense that it 
plausibly justifies public disapprobation, for instance). The challenge posed by Simmons 
appears highly relevant to our second question, about just when free-riding is an appropriate 
target of opprobrium, by supplying an account which ties opprobrium to specific features of 
free-riders’ intentions. And Simmons’s attempted narrowing of the scope of the principle 
hinges on the fact that it is sometimes – perhaps often – difficult to reliably attribute those 
intention-specific features to concrete cases. As Simmons24 points out, ignorance may 
sometimes look ‘culpable’ or, as another theorist has recently put it, ‘motivationally-biased’ 
and self-serving;25 but in other cases ignorance appears innocent. In the latter cases, he 
claims, the charge of free-riding is a fish out of water. 
My argument, though, is officially uninterested in the question whether free-riding is 
deserving of this kind of opprobrium. It is perfectly possible that cases of free-riding exist 
where agents innocently fail to realise that they are dependent on necessary collective goods 
and that their dependence obliges others to bear greater costs. When that is the case, it 
plausibly influences the stance we should take towards free-riders, so that our correct 
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response is not to condemn them for parasitism, say, but merely to draw their attention to the 
fact that their actions are inadvertently loading costs on to others, and require them to desist. 
My argument is that innocence about costs by no means rules out those agents having duties 
to share those costs in the first place, and that there is at least one class of goods – broadly, 
collective goods the protection or production of which is mandated by justice – in which the 
knowledge-related scope restriction is implausible. In cases of pure public goods – on which 
libertarian objections to the principle of fairness tend to hinge – consumption is non-
subtractive and innocent ignorance is, as a consequence, cost-free. My argument can stay 
neutral on whether this attenuates or defeats any duties to share in the costs. But in the 
Arborean case, in which consumption is subtractive, greater costs are imposed on those who 
pay for protection or production by the very fact of others’ consumption. And given that we 
have already stipulated in the Arborean case that protection is necessary, we are pushed 
towards the conclusion that all of those who benefit are liable to bear a fair share of costs 
whether or not they accept that those costs exist. When we consider the issue from the 
perspective of those who are currently bearing the costs of protection – who are being asked, 
under the knowledge condition, to bear greater costs whenever someone sincerely denies that 
a necessary, costly benefit is indeed necessary or costly – it is hard to see why we would deny 
that, regardless of its blameworthiness or innocence, loading additional costs onto others in 
this way is a pro tanto wrong.  
The willingness condition suffers a similar fate in the case of collective goods whose 
protection or production is mandated by justice. A willingness condition asserts that it is 
inappropriate to invoke the principle of fairness so as to demand that people contribute to the 
costs of schemes whose benefits they have no desire to partake in. In Arborea-type cases, a 
quick but rather ad hoc way to rebuff this suggestion would suggest that in the real world the 
carbon-sequestering services of the rainforests are solicited: national and international leaders 
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regularly visit countries like Brazil or Ecuador and entreat their leaders to halt deforestation. 
They even, from time to time, offer economic inducements such as ‘debt-for-nature deals’; 
we appear to have, rather than an unsolicited benefit, a benefit the price of which the wealthy 
are still haggling over. But that would only be a fully satisfying response if we knew that 
such entreaties represented the wishes of all of us, and this is unlikely to be true. What, then, 
of people who would genuinely prefer not to benefit from the carbon-sequestration functions 
of the Amazon, whatever their leaders sometimes say? What can we say to those people? 
Again, a more fundamental response is possible. It is a feature of our case that 
rainforest protection is necessary. We can grant – and should grant – that those who offset 
their emissions have already discharged their duty to share in costs and bear no further duties 
(see note 19). We can also grant – and should grant - that if alternative forms of sequestration 
become available through some successful geo-engineering project or other, the moral 
situation would change. If those alternatives were cheaper than rainforest protection, not 
least, then rainforest protection ceases to be worth its costs – ceases to be necessary, in fact - 
and that reason for rainforest protection recedes.26 That concession, as Simmons is aware, 
may be a thorny one for those who would build an account of political obligation on the back 
of the principle of fairness (because it appears to challenge duties to obey particular states 
when other states can provide the same services more cheaply), but that is not our concern 
here. In this sense, therefore, we can happily agree that benefits must be voluntarily accepted: 
where (and only where) alternative providers are available, those who wish to defect from 
particular schemes providing necessary collective goods cannot be accused of free-riding (on 
the proviso that what they do consume is not cadged from some other scheme whose costs 
they are not sharing either). But what is not tenable – and ought to be considered free-riding – 
is consuming sequestering capacity whilst doing nothing to share in its costs anywhere. What 
is objectionable, in the absence of such schemes and in the absence of offsetting one’s 
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emissions, is to refuse to contribute to the costs of maintaining the greenhouse gas sinks we 
do currently have, but to continue to consume their capacity and thereby reduce the 
opportunities of others. And in the case of collective goods whose protection or production is 
mandated by justice, that conclusion goes through whether we would wish to depend on these 
goods or not. Willingness, and not only knowingness, fails to make its case as a necessary 
condition for the bearing of duties to share in the costs of (at least some, important cases of) 
public good provision.  
 
 
V. 
 
We should also consider a second set of objections which would restrict the principle of 
fairness to goods which have been produced in certain ways. Perhaps it matters which people 
produce public goods, for whom. It might be argued that the principle ought not to apply to 
costs incurred by members of one cooperative scheme in producing or protecting benefits 
which are in fact enjoyed by others. On one view, it might be the lack of a single cooperative 
scheme spanning all beneficiaries which makes a normative difference.27 It is hard to see, 
though, why we should place such a restriction on the operation of the principle of fairness. 
Look again at the Poisoned Lake case. In that case a good has to be protected, or else the vital 
interests of members of more than one community will be seriously affected. And someone 
needs to pay for that provision or protection. Even if there is currently no single cooperative 
scheme to fairly distribute the benefits and burdens, this does not make it fair to land one 
community with all of the costs of provision or protection. To the contrary, such cases might 
even provide a good context for the duty to set up wider institutional schemes to regulate 
background injustice.  
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On another version of the objection, perhaps it is the intentions of producers or 
protectors which matter. That, in any case, is the suggestion of Paula Casal and Andrew 
Williams, and of Simmons. It is entirely possible that, in the absence of a cost-pooling 
scheme, Arboreans would choose to protect their rainforests in any case, in defence of 
Arborean citizens’ interests (just as country A, if country B offered no assistance, would 
presumably cap the geyser in Poisoned Lake at its own expense). But if benefiting others is a 
merely accidental result of actions which agents are going to undertake in any case, does the 
same pressure to share the costs arise? Might our knowledge of such intentions not caution 
against applying the principle of fairness? Even if the intentions of consumers do not matter 
in quite the way suggested by some critics of the principle, don’t the intentions of producers 
matter? We might distinguish a number of versions of this challenge. A relatively weak 
version of the challenge would hold that the principle only applies to cases where costs are 
considered costs by producers or protectors, and where they actually intend to produce or 
protect benefits (whoever those benefits are for).28 A stronger version of the challenge would 
hold that for the principle to apply, it must be the case that producers or protectors intend to 
act beneficently with regards to agents other than themselves: that part of their explicit 
intention, we might say, is to act with at least one eye towards the ‘common good,’ or at least 
that enabling the consumption of others is an irreducible part of the motivation for production 
or protection.29 
The weak version of the challenge does not represent an obstacle for my argument, 
since the Arborea and Poisoned Lake cases meet its conditions (as is usually true of cases of 
environmental protection30). In both cases protecting countries act with the intention of 
securing the continued existence of benefits, and the costs of doing so are considered costs by 
those who protect. The same cannot, however, be said in response to the stronger version. 
Hence it represents a serious obstacle if the conditions it specifies are justified. In Poisoned 
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Lake, recall, we did not attribute to country A any irreducible desire to advance the interests 
of country B: if country B did not exist, country A would still act in the same way (by 
capping the noxious geyser), and its motivations are explicable with reference to its own 
interests alone.  
But consider that while in Poisoned Lake the motivations of country A are explicable 
in a purely self-regarding fashion, its costs of action are not.  In the case of collective goods 
consumption is subtractive, and hence the fact that country B cannot be excluded from 
consuming the good in question means that the costs borne by country A are higher. The 
same point applies to Arboreans, the costs borne by whom rise in proportion to total world 
emissions, rather than in proportion to their own emissions alone.31 In those circumstances 
outsiders’ refusal to pay a share of those costs appears egregious even if neither Arboreans 
nor inhabitants of country A have any regard for the interests of outsiders. In reaching the 
conclusion that the costs of protecting necessary collective goods should be pooled, we can 
therefore deny that intentions to advance the common good are necessary. What is salient, 
instead, is that it is morally required that somebody bears costs, and that the non-excludable 
nature of the benefits concerned means that outsiders are able to unilaterally load those costs 
onto protectors who cannot avoid incurring them. 
The strong version of the challenge fails, then, in cases of necessary collective goods. 
Indeed this particular attempt at scope-restriction also faces embarrassment in cases of 
necessary pure public goods, in which it will not reliably deliver plausible conclusions either. 
Establishing that fact is not necessary for my argument, but it is worth demonstrating because 
it reveals the deep implausibility of the stronger version of the challenge. Consider the 
following example, with three different outcomes: 
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Manna Destruction. Human life depends upon the existence of 10 units of a manna-
 like good (regardless of how many people exist). Manna is produced by plants, and 
 each person, in a ten-person world, owns land containing enough plants to produce 10 
 units each. One night people observe a meteor storm which will, the next day, destroy 
 all manna-plants unless costly shelters are constructed. 
Outcome 1: the ten inhabitants agree to each protect sufficient plants to produce 1 unit 
 of manna. 
Outcome 2: the ten inhabitants discuss each protecting sufficient plants to produce 1 
 unit of manna, but one of them volunteers to protect all of his own manna-plants 
 instead. 
Outcome 3: the inhabitants discuss each protecting sufficient plants to produce 1 unit 
 of manna, but then notice that one inhabitant is still asleep. The other nine go back to 
 bed secure in the knowledge that when he wakes up, he will have to protect all of his 
 plants. When he wakes up he is furious, wishes in no way to benefit those who have 
 tricked him, but grudgingly protects all of his manna-plants. 
 
Assume that Outcome 1 is just. What do we want to say about the other two outcomes? If the 
stronger version of the challenge from beneficent intentions is correct, then our critic must 
agree that there can be a claim to cost-pooling under Outcome 2, but not under Outcome 3. 
But those are the wrong conclusions.  
In Outcome 2 it is plausible to suggest that intentions do make a normative difference, 
but the way in which they matter is not tracked by the stronger version of the challenge. One 
thing which becomes apparent, considering this case, is that the stronger version of the 
challenge suffers from a lack of clarity about what counts as intending to benefit others. We 
need to know, to be specific, whether acting in order to benefit others denotes an intention 
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simply to secure benefits for others, or whether it also necessarily includes an intention to 
bear the costs of doing so. I will return to the first clause later, but it is relatively easy to see 
why the second clause cannot be a plausible condition for obligations to share costs to arise. 
To see why, consider what it would commit us to. If (and only if) our lone protecting agent 
under Outcome 2 intends not only to benefit the other nine inhabitants but also to bear the 
costs, then we are committed to saying that costs should be pooled – but in this case the 
argument for cost-pooling appears rather redundant. As defenders of the principle have 
themselves suggested, intentions may qualify the scope of the principle in cases of gift-
giving.32 Embracing our second clause, though, would implausibly restrict the principle to 
cases of gift-giving. If on the other hand our lone agent intended to benefit the other nine 
inhabitants but not to bear all of the costs – if his intention, that is, was to act decisively to 
ensure that a necessary act of protection did in fact occur, and to ask the nine to pay their fair 
share of costs later - then we are committed to saying that his intention to later ask for costs 
to be shared actually cancels any duty the nine might have to share in the costs. But that is 
surely counter-intuitive (and, moreover, consider the deterrent effect it would place on those 
who seek to act decisively to tackle urgent threats where collective action is not guaranteed, 
but where benefits are – as we have stipulated - both necessary and worth their costs). An 
intention to bear the full costs when we protect goods cannot be a necessary condition for the 
principle of fairness to apply to those costs. 
 In Outcome 3 the stronger version of the challenge fares no better. Under Outcome 3 
the behaviour of the nine agents is, I submit, a plain exercise in free-riding insofar as costs 
which are necessary for the good of all are forced onto the shoulders of a single agent, who 
cannot avoid bearing them. That is the case notwithstanding the fact that our sole producer 
bears no greater costs than he would bear if he were the only agent living in the world. That 
counterfactual (much-loved by libertarians), which indicates that the consumption of others is 
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in that sense cost-free, leads us astray. A more instructive counterfactual would contrast 
Outcome 3 with Outcome 1, and ask whether we have any reason to regard a transition from 
the latter to the former as non-justice-infringing. Furthermore, in arriving at the conclusion 
that forcing costs onto one agent in Outcome 3 involves injustice, the fact that our lone 
protecting agent does not intend to benefit the other nine inhabitants appears irrelevant. It 
does not tell us, in this case at least, that he is not being treated unfairly when others require 
him to bear all of the costs of protection. We do not need to know that our lone agent 
intended to bear the costs of protection (for he did not). And neither, moreover, do we need to 
know that an irreducible element of the explanation of his behaviour was that he intended to 
benefit others (he did not). Neither condition, then, is necessary for the principle of fairness to 
apply. This brief example cannot show, naturally, that intentions never matter. But it does 
show that beneficent intentions are not a necessary condition for the principle of fairness to 
apply. The attempted producer-side scope-restriction fails not only to rule out cost-sharing 
conclusions in Arborea-type cases, but in at least some cases where consumption is non-
subtractive too.   
 
 
 VI.   
 
The argument thus far has endorsed the pro tanto claim that the costs of protecting the 
carbon-sequestering capacity of rainforests ought to be shared between beneficiaries. But 
perhaps agreement on that might depend, in part, on how expansively we understand the set 
of morally relevant costs. The argument, we might suppose, will be easier to make in the case 
of direct costs. Suppose that Arboreans have to spend $200 million in protecting their forests 
from threats from fire, flood, gnawing insects, and so on. If costs have been incurred, if the 
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threats were genuine, and if the share of costs we will ask outsiders to pay are at least 
matched by the value of the benefits they are thereby able to enjoy in continuing to emit 
carbon dioxide without dangerous climate change, the argument for cost-sharing appears 
relatively straightforward.   
But it is possible that the opportunity costs of rainforest protection will be much 
greater than the direct costs. They represent the potential income foregone when factors of 
production are used in one way rather than another. If we assume maximal economic 
rationality, then the opportunity cost will be the value of the next-best alternative use to 
which factors of production such as natural resources could have been put. In practice 
resources are not always used to their full economic potential, and where this is so 
opportunity costs can exceed current revenues. This is likely the case with rainforests: a 
particular hectare of rainforest, we might imagine, delivers fairly meagre economic benefits 
to its Arborean inhabitants, but could generate much more if felled for timber and converted 
to grazing pasture. This, we can further imagine, is precisely why Arboreans want to clear it.  
But should opportunity costs be shared? I want to consider an objection to sharing 
opportunity costs which holds that sharing opportunity costs is inappropriate in cases where 
the person apparently bearing the cost of not doing ɸ has in any case a duty not to do ɸ. If 
such an objection holds it might bite in the Arborean case, and give us a compelling reason 
not to share with Arboreans the opportunity costs of preserving their rainforests. We might 
believe, to be specific, that Arboreans should not tear up their rainforests, that if they did they 
would commit a serious injustice, injuring even the most basic rights of many people. If so, 
then perhaps it is inappropriate to use the potential benefits arising from deforestation as a 
benchmark for calculating transfers. This returns us, in a sense, to the charge that Ecuador is 
engaging in ecological hostage-taking or blackmail. We may believe that we should not pay 
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hostage-takers, because doing so is paying them not to do things they ought not to do 
anyway.   
We can grant, though, that Arboreans should not tear up their forests but still hold that 
we should pay them for not doing so. For the view that we ought never to be paid when 
performing duties of justice – or when refraining from committing injustices - should be 
rejected. It would be easy – but wrong - to conflate the claim that we have a duty to ɸ with 
the independent claim that we have a duty to bear the costs of performing ɸ. There will be 
cases where the two will plausibly run together and others where they do not, and the answer 
may depend on why they have been allocated the first duty. After obliging someone to carry 
out community work because she had committed an act of vandalism, it would be odd to then 
underwrite the costs she incurs in doing so (we might think the same in the case of citizens’ 
community service, assuming that making a sacrifice is part of the point of such activities). 
But when selecting an agent to bear a duty because a task is necessary but he alone possesses 
the capacity to perform it, it would be much less odd to underwrite the costs he incurs in 
performing that duty.  
Consider the following example. A given community is plagued by wildfires. Its only 
way of extinguishing them is by pulling water from a deep well, but this requires 
considerable strength. It selects its ten strongest members, and charges them with remaining 
close by the well on a rota system. The decision is justifiable, but it also produces distributive 
unfairness if we refuse to share the costs of performing that duty. And it does not matter, 
here, which kind of cost we are talking about. One of the people selected points out that since 
he lives on the farthest reaches of the community, it will cost him $10 to travel to the well. 
Another points out that in order to fulfil her allocated slot she will be too busy to collect $10 
which would otherwise be due to her. In both cases the argument for defraying those costs 
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appears sound – assuming, again, that benefits are worth their costs - and it does not appear to 
make any difference that the first is a direct cost and the second is an opportunity cost.  
We can, then, coherently hold that agents are obliged to do ɸ at the same time as 
recognising that doing ɸ is costly for them and that part or all of that cost ought to be 
defrayed. The claim that Arboreans ought not to chop down their forests does not establish 
that it is wrong to share in the opportunity costs of rainforest protection. The argument for 
sharing the costs of protection can survive this objection, especially where we have selected 
agents to perform a duty because they have some special capability to perform it. Not, 
perhaps, if the reason we have selected agent x is that agent x is very wealthy. But if we have 
selected agent x because she has medical skills, or because he is physically able to operate a 
well, compensation is defensible. Likewise, even if we believe that Arboreans have a duty to 
protect their forests – since they are the ones who have forests – justice can demand that the 
costs of performing the duty are shared, and these include either direct or opportunity costs.  
 
 
VII. 
 
This paper began with the real-world example of Ecuador’s Yasuni Initiative, which implored 
the rest of the world to share the costs imposed by rainforest protection in the interests of 
climate security. It went on to provide an argument why outsiders can be bound by duties of 
justice to contribute funds to such schemes. Indeed if successful the argument may well apply 
to the protection of other resources which secure significant ecosystem benefits, or to the 
results of any geoengineering schemes which might come to fruition. In each case we could 
develop a normative account linking the receipt of benefits with the sinking of costs into 
protection, and the argument from the principle of fairness provides one such account.  
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 Although there may be other routes to the conclusion that costs should be shared, 
several features of the argument from fairness are worth noting. First, I have suggested that it 
has the potential to convince even those sceptical of the more ambitious arguments of global 
egalitarians, and who cleave to the principle that nation-states should be sovereign over the 
natural resources contained within their territories. Second (and not unrelatedly), it reflects 
the arguments that political actors in the global South are actually making. Moreover, insofar 
as it draws upon familiar and far from esoteric claims about the wrongness of free-riding, it 
has the potential to resonate with the arguments of real-world political actors, and to help 
build political coalitions. Still, we should be clear-headed about what making such an 
argument can achieve. I do not claim, of course, that simply unpacking and eludicating the 
argument is sufficient to guarantee progress. As Ecuador’s president has pointed out, ‘As 
long as power relations don’t change, there will be a lot of rhetoric [in favour of sharing 
protection costs] and few actions.’ On the other hand, Correia has suggested precisely that 
rather than waiting for fundamental changes to global power relations to emerge, the best 
hope is to stir the indignation of ‘citizens of the North’ by revealing the extent to which their 
lifestyles constitute a form of free-riding on countries enmeshed in poverty, and asking them 
to ‘Imagine for a moment that the situation was the other way around.’33 This article is a 
contribution to that project. It suggests that viewing contributions to forest protection as 
charitable acts is a serious mis-framing. Payments for protection are required if we are not to 
play a part in keeping developing countries in poverty, leaving them to continue to protect a 
public good upon which our own lifestyles are all too heavily dependent, at the cost of their 
own economic advancement.  
 If laying out the best normative arguments is one important challenge, designing 
sound policies is another. The paper has defended the view that rainforests should be 
protected at least because of their sequestering function, and that costs ought to be shared at 
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least for that reason.34 Nevertheless, the results thus far of schemes to share the costs of 
protecting rainforests, such as the United Nations REDD+ scheme35 (aimed at Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation), have been decidedly mixed. And this 
is not only because they have been, to date, chronically underfunded. According to critics, the 
goal of protecting carbon-sequestering capacity has too often come at the expense of two 
other significant justice goals: the protection of biodiversity, and the protection of the 
lifestyles of indigenous communities currently living in the rainforests. On the first goal, 
critics have suggested that a focus on measuring and securing carbon-sequestering capacity 
has sometimes led to either a neglect of the value of biodiversity, or at worst, to damage to 
biodiversity as native forests are razed and replanted by non-native trees which are more 
efficient at sequestering carbon. In the worst cases, under current incentive structures havens 
for biodiversity threaten to become ‘green deserts,’ far less capable of supporting the rich 
forms of interdependence associated with pristine rainforests. On the second goal, critics 
point out that local communities are sometimes marginalised – or even excluded – once 
forests come to be seen as valuable carbon sinks the absorptive capacity of which is to be 
maximised. Once a formula is in place which disburses funds on the basis of tonnes of carbon 
sequester per square kilometre, indigenous practices can be seen as a distraction or even a 
threat.36  
Critics of such schemes do not, of course, object to the idea that carbon sinks should 
be protected or, as far as I can tell, to the claim that it would be iniquitous if forest states had 
to bear the costs of protection alone. But they do strongly object to the way in which policy 
has been implemented, and in which the safeguards envisaged under the United Nations 
framework have gone by the wayside. According to those guidelines, priority is to be placed 
in REDD+ schemes upon both the ‘conservation of natural forests and biological diversity,’ 
and the ‘full and effective participation of…indigenous peoples and local communities’ in 
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conservation schemes, as well as their protection from adverse impact.37 Neither goal has 
been realised consistently to date.  
But still, we should not accept a counsel of despair about the prospects for a more 
balanced conservation programme. Many studies have shown that the goals of biodiversity, 
indigenous participation and sink protection can go hand-in-hand. There is good evidence, for 
instance, that forest degradation is reduced when local, as opposed to centralised, rule-
enforcement is in place, and when benefits from protection schemes are widely dispersed 
among local inhabitants rather than being monopolised by elites.38 Along with failures in 
forest conservation there have been successes, in which indigenous groups have been active 
participants and biodiversity has been protected for current and future generations. There is 
strong evidence, for instance, that the precise methodology employed to measure carbon 
sequestration makes a significant difference. In particular, participatory monitoring 
techniques involving local communities in assessing forest health have proven to be 
(unsurprisingly) effective in spreading benefits and securing indigenous livelihoods, but 
(perhaps more surprisingly) cheaper than remote expert monitoring techniques whilst being 
equally effective.39 If so, the prospects for designing policies capable of securing a broad 
range of justice goals – showing appropriate concern for sequestration, biodiversity and 
indigenous lifestyles – are much better than is often feared. The poor performance of some 
protection schemes to date certainly points to the dangers of elite capture and the 
accompanying skewed distribution of benefits; but they do not establish, fortunately, that 
conservation policy cannot also deliver for indigenous groups whilst securing biodiversity. 
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